

1972

YEAR
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SECURITY GRADING

UP

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SECURITY

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16 May 72

It is concluded from this that the rate of production is not determined so much by the tanker market as by the relations between the Government and the companies and the attempt by the companies to put pressure on the Government since the latest talks reached a difficult stage in February. It is no secret that this decrease in the export rate and the consequent decrease in Government royalties will have serious effects on the implementation of the economic development projects and will obstruct development and the raising of the Iraqi national income, thus causing the gravest harm to the Iraqi economy.

While explaining these facts the Government of the Iraqi Republic at the same time warns the companies against the grave consequences of this dangerous policy, which only leads to weakening relations between the Government and the companies. The Government cannot stand idle before an issue which touches one of the people's essential interests.

[Note: A shorter report of the statement transmitted by the Iraqi News Agency (in Arabic 0940 gmt 14 May 72) included the following paragraph: "It is known that three British companies are undertaking the production of crude oil in Iraqi oilfields. They are: the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company, the Basrah Petroleum Company."]

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Iraqi Government Changes

(a) Baghdad home service in Arabic 1705 gmt 14 May 72

Text of Republican Decree issued by President Bakr on 14th May 1972:

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph (c) of Article 57 of the Provisional Constitution, we decree the following:

(1) The following appointments are made:

Ministers

Communications	Dr. Rashid Muhammad Sa'id ar-Rifa'i
Youth	Adnan Ayyub Sabri al-Izzi
Information	Hamid Alwan al-Juburi
✓ Planning	Dr. Jawad Hashim
✓ Economy	Hikmat al-Azzawi
✓ Irrigation	Mukarram al-Talabani
✓ Higher Education and Scientific Research	Dr. Hisham ash-Shawi
✓ Minister of State	Amir Abdullah

(2) The following are relieved of their posts: Shafiq Abd al-Jabbar al-Kamali of his post as Minister of Information; Dr. Su'ad Khalil Isma'il of her post as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; and Dr. Taha Ibrahim al-Abdullah of his post as Irrigation Minister.

(b) Editorial report:

Other decrees issued by President Bakr on 14th May and broadcast by Baghdad home service (in Arabic 1705 gmt 14 May 72) announced the following: the appointment of Shafiq Abd al-Jabbar al-Kamali as a member of the Educational Affairs Office at the Revolution Command Council, and of Dr. Taha Ibrahim al-Abdullah as a full-time member of the Supreme Agricultural Council; also the appointment of Foreign Minister Murtada Sa'id Abd al-Baqi to be acting Information Minister during the absence abroad of Hamid Alwan al-Juburi, of Youth Minister Adnan Ayyub Sabri to be acting Communications Minister during the absence abroad of Dr. Rashid Muhammad Sa'id ar-Rifa'i and of Education Minister Dr. Ahmad Abd as-Sattar al-Juwari to be acting Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research during the absence abroad of Dr. Hisham ash-Shawi.

(c) Baghdad home service in Arabic 0430 gmt 15 May 72

Text of report:

Dear listener, here are brief biographical notes on the four new ministers.

Hikmat al-Azzawi: Hikmat al-Azzawi was born in Awashiq village in Diyala Province in 1934. He completed his elementary education in his village, and his intermediate and secondary education in Ba'quba secondary school. In 1955 he graduated from the Iraqi Commerce and Economy College and was appointed Supervisor of the Balance of Payments and Chief Supervisor of the Balance of Payments at the Iraqi Central Bank until the July revolution 1958. He was hunted down and detained during Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime for taking part in the national movement. He occupied the post of assistant in the Foreign Currency Transfer Department in the Central Bank after the Ba'th revolution in 1963. He left his post for two years after the November apostasy. Afterwards he was appointed auditor in the General Electrical Industries Company. Later he was appointed stores director and director of marketing in the company until the 17th July revolution in 1968. After the revolution he was appointed director general of the Government Sales Authority. Afterwards he was appointed head of the General Establishment of Trade and Economy Ministry Under Secretary. He is a member of the Iraqi Economists' Association, a member of the Association's board of directors and chief editor of 'Al-Iqtisad' magazine. He became a minister for the first time on 14th May 1972, when he was appointed Economy Minister.

Mukarram at-Talabani: Mukarram at-Talabani was born in (? Zardat) village in Kifri district in Kirkuk Province in 1925. He completed his elementary, intermediate and secondary education in the village. He obtained the certificate of the Iraqi Law College in 1946 and practised law for two years after graduation. He was detained for seven years in 1948 following demonstrations staged by the December movement. In 1959 he was appointed director general of the Tobacco Monopoly Department. Later he was appointed an inspector general at the Agrarian Reform Ministry. He went back to practising law and after the 17th July revolution he was reappointed an inspector as well as adviser in the Agrarian Reform Ministry. He is a member of the Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee. He is also chief editor of 'Ath-Thaqafah al-Jadidah' magazine, secretary general of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Association, a member of the World Peace Council, a member of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and deputy chairman of the Kurdish Culture Society. He became a minister for the first time on 14th May 1972, when he was appointed Irrigation Minister.

Amir Abdullah: Amir Abdullah was born in Anah village in Al-Anbar Province in 1926. He completed his elementary, intermediate and secondary education in the village. He obtained the certificate of the Law College in 1947. He practised law. He was not given any government posts until he became a minister. He was hunted down for a long period during the previous regimes for political reasons. He is a member of the Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee, a member of the World Peace Council, a member of the Lawyers Association Council and a member of the Journalists' Association.

Dr. Nizar at-Tabaqchali: Dr. Nizar at-Tabaqchali was born in Baghdad in 1934. He completed his elementary, intermediate and secondary education in Baghdad. He obtained a law baccalaureate from the Iraqi Law College in 1957. He obtained a state doctorate in political sciences in Paris in 1964. After obtaining the doctorate he was appointed a lecturer at Baghdad University. He transferred to the Law College, where he later obtained the title of Assistant Professor in Political Sciences. In 1967 he was appointed Director General of Radio and Television until the outbreak of the 17th July revolution. He is a member of the Iraqi Lawyers' Association. He is married and has one child. He became a minister for the first time on 14th May 1972, when he was appointed Minister of State.

Miss Taylor

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

Please check list of ministers
against 1972 personalities &
mark with 'C' those who are



UNCLASSIFIED
1/3

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

only three of these
ministers are in this 16 May 1972
years personality report of 5.
B. J. 5.
Mr Smith for info
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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 19 MAY 1972
NBR 1/2

Dear Graham

NEW IRAQI MINISTERS

1. A Ministerial reshuffle was announced on 15 May, which involved 3 Ministers (including the only woman Minister) being dismissed, 3 Ministers taking up different portfolios, and 6 newcomers being brought in, comprising 2 Communists, 2 Nationalists and 2 Ba'athists.
2. I enclose a list of the Ministers as they now are.
3. Details of the newcomers are as follows:

a. Dr Jewad Mahmoud Hashem (Minister of Planning).
He was Minister of Planning 1968 to 1971. See our current LPR. (then released).

b. Dr Hisham al-Shawi (Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research)

A former Dean of the College of Law and Politics at Al Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad, he was appointed an Ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1972, and Iraqi Delegate to the UN in Geneva in March (My letter 25/2 of 8 March - not to all).

c. Sd Mukarram al-Talabani (Minister of Irrigation)

A Kurd born in 1925 of a prominent Kurdish family. After obtaining a Law diploma in 1946 he practised for 2 years and was then arrested and imprisoned for a further 7. In 1959 he became Director General of the Tobacco Monopoly and shortly afterwards DG of Inspection in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. He was dismissed following the overthrow of Qassem in February 1963. After the July 1968 revolution he was reinstated in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform as an Inspector and Adviser. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, Editor-in-Chief of the monthly "Al-Thaqaffa al-Jadida", Secretary-General of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Society, a member of the World Peace Council, a member of the

.../Afro-



Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Kurdish Cultural Association.

c d. Sd Amer Abdullah (Minister of State)

Born in 1926 and qualified and practised as a lawyer. He was a founder-member of the "orthodox" Iraqi Communist Party in 1960 but after it merged with a rival group, fell out with it and was expelled. He was imprisoned under both the Qassem and the Aref régimes. He is now a member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party and of the World Peace Council, Iraqi Bar Association and the Iraqi Journalists Union. I believe he appears in our LPR for 1970.

e. Sd Hikmat al-Azzawi (Minister of Economy)

1934 The Baghdad Observer quotes him as having been born in 1944 but this seems unlikely, since he graduated from the Iraqi College of Commerce and Economics in 1955 and worked in the Central Bank of Iraq until the 1958 revolution. He was imprisoned during Qassem's régime but reappeared at the Central Bank during February - November 1963. In November 1965 he joined the State Company for Electrical Industries as an accountant and then as Spares Director and Inter Marketing Director. Following the July 1968 revolution he became DG of the State Purchasing Board and then Head of the State Trade Establishment and finally Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Economy.

f. Dr Nazar al-Tabaqchali (Minister of State)

Born in 1934 in Baghdad of a well-known Iraqi family. Read law at the Iraqi Law College and then political science in Paris, where he obtained a Ph.D in 1964. He returned to become a Lecturer and later an Assistant Professor at Baghdad University and in 1967 became a DG of Radio and Television until the July 1968 revolution. It is not clear what happened to him after that.

4. I also enclose a copy of a statement issued by the ICP about its decision to accept these Ministerial posts.

*Tom
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c.c. (with enclosures) to Chanceries at:
BEIRUT, KUWAIT, AMMAN, TEHRAN, CAIRO, MOSCOW

IRAQI MINISTERS.
(As on 14 May, 1972)

NEW

Field Marshal Ahmad Hasan al Bakr	President of the Republic.	
b. General Hammad Shihab	Minister of Defence. <i>Yahya</i>	
General Saadun Ghaidan	Minister of the Interior.	
Sd. Murtadha Said Abdul Baqi <i>Al Hadithi</i>	Minister of Foreign Affairs.	
Sd. Amin Abdul Karim	Minister of Finance.	
Sd. Husain Muhammad Ridha al Safi	Minister of Justice.	
Dr. Ahmad Abdul Sattar al Jawari	Minister of Education.	
Dr. Hisham al Shawi	Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research.	✓
Sd. Anwar Abdul Qadir al Hadithi	Minister of Labour & Social Affairs.	
Dr. Izzat Mustafa	Minister of Health.	
Sd. Hamid Alwan al Jeburi	Minister of Information.	
Sd. Rashid Muhammad Said al Refa'ie	Minister of Communications.	
Sd. Nafidh Jalal Huwaizi	Minister of Agriculture.	
Sd. Izzat Ibrahim al Duri	Minister of Agrarian Reform.	
c Sd. Mukarram al Talabani	Minister of Irrigation.	✓
Sd. Nuri Shawis	Minister of Works & Housing.	
Dr. Jawad Hashim	Minister of Planning.	✓
Sd. Hikmat al Azzawi	Minister of Economy.	✓
Sd. Taha al Jazrawi	Minister of Industry.	
Dr. Saadun Hummadi	Minister of Oil & Minerals.	
Sd. Ihsan Shirzad	Minister of Municipalities.	
Sd. Adnan Ayyub Sabri al Izzi	Minister of Youth. <i>[ex Comms.]</i>	
Sd. Muhammad Mahmud	Minister of Development of the North.	
Dr. Abdullah al Khudhayyir	Minister of Unity.	
Sd. Khalid Makki al Hashimi	Minister of Transport.	
Sd. Salih al Yusifi	Minister of State.	
c Sd. Aziz Sharif	Minister of State.	
Dr. Nazar al Tabaqchali	Minister of State.	✓
c Sd. 'Amir Abdullah	Minister of State.	✓

May, 1972.


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ITALIAN EMBASSY

316.01.00



Telex No. 749 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

Baghdad, 15 May 1972.

Subject: Internal political situation


Since ~~after~~ the Treaty with the Soviet Union and the overtures by that regime to other Arab countries, the leadership now seems to be turning its attention to the internal situation.

Thus, while foreign policy is continuing on its new course under the stimulus of events here which have ^{come to a head} ~~developed~~, as a result of the consolidation of friendship with Moscow, it has seemed to the leadership to be necessary to embark on several initiatives designed to strengthen its position of power in the country.

In the first place provision ~~was~~ made for adequate propaganda among the "working masses" on behalf of the Soviet Union and the bloc of countries which it leads. This was obviously ~~been~~ a concerted step with Moscow and ~~has~~ found expression in the intense dissemination of anti-imperialist anti-Zionist and anti-American arguments.

All the organising sections of the Baath, together with those of the Communist ^{Party} and ^{the} already ~~Marxist~~ Nationalist Party ~~have~~ responded to the propaganda appeal which ~~has~~ ^{was} ~~been~~ extended and repeated throughout the country, except of course in the Kurdish regions.

After these basic preparations the regime



launched the People's Militia which was to form the armed guard of the revolution. The initiative was maintained in particular by the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council, Saddam Hussein, ~~who~~ who has almost made it his own.

Officers from the army, chosen from among the youngest and most indoctrinated by the Baath, were entrusted with the task of organising the volunteers for national defence who enlisted ^{for their country} during the demonstrations which ~~took~~ were held in the principal towns.

mezz mechanical
About ten thousand militiamen ~~were~~ equipped with automatic weapons and even mechanical means, ^{paraded} ~~massed~~ ⁱⁿ Baghdad. The review, which would have been a personal triumph for Saddam Hussein, was however attended at the last minute by the President of the Republic himself who ^{merely} made an allusive speech on the need for uniting the constructive forces of the ^{Iraqi} Revolution and avoiding everything that might divide the country.

It seemed to everybody that President al Bakr meant his statements ~~to be~~ ^{to be} a rope to the Armed Forces ~~which~~ whose prestige had already been shaken for so many reasons and were displeased with the ~~setting up~~ ^{formation} of these new armed peoples phalanges.

But not the Kurdish difference
In this way the leadership has, by this clear expression of its collective will, papered over the ~~the~~ internal differences which still exist and also the excessive whims of the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council himself, Saddam Hussein, who has nevertheless ~~has~~ proved to be the strongest man at the summit of power on this political stage.



After the formation of the armed guard of the revolution they have gone on to reconsider the National Front whose constitution, as is well known, represents a somewhat difficult problem. The Kurds indeed are ~~for~~ persisting in their suspicious and detached attitude towards the central Government. They ~~consider~~ ^{consider} that real internal unity cannot be achieved unless all the points of the famous Manifesto of 11 March ~~were~~ first applied in practice.

Any efforts made by the Baathist leadership to ~~ameliorate~~ ^{alleviate} this situation have failed, at least until ~~the~~ now. However, there ~~are~~ ^{is} in progress near Suleimaniyah next to the frontier with Iran a ~~meeting~~ ^{meeting} of the top leaders ~~and~~ of the Kurdish Democratic Party ~~which~~ ^{who}, will decide on the line to be taken in the "struggle to uphold the just rights of the Kurdish people."

In any case, ~~the regime is in~~ ^{it has} ~~reticence~~ in the action which ~~has been~~ ^{it has} taken, the regime is persisting also in trying to convince the leader, Barzani that it is now time to agree to full ~~cooperation~~ ^{cooperation} with the central power. In this it is ~~making use of~~ ^{availing itself of} Soviet support as well and, it seems, of the mediation offered by the Embassy of the USSR here which is actively working to overcome Iraq's internal difficulties.

Pending the development of more favourable events ~~events~~ regarding the eternal problem of ~~of~~ relations with the Kurds, the Revolutionary Council, as reported by telegram, has carried out an important reshuffle of the ministerial team here.

Two communists and two Nasirite nationalists have joined the Government

No idea
What this
is -
does
Bonetti

which has always consisted of members of the Baath apart from some ~~technical~~ technical experts of proven ability. This is significant because it shows the regime's willingness to extend the running of the country to other parties.

However, the reshuffle is not only important because of its internal repercussions, ~~again~~ ^{but} also as regards the Soviet Union and Egypt, both of whom have for years been supporters of Iraqi political forces consisting of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Nationalist Party well known as "Nasserite" until a short time ago.

The communist ministers are: Mukarram al Talabani ~~to~~ who has been entrusted with the portfolio for Irrigation, one of the most important ministries in Iraq, and Amer Abdullah, Minister of State.

Al Talabani, a member of ~~the~~ ^{his Party's} Central Committee is a very well known ~~figure~~ ^{figure}, but should not be confused with ~~another~~ ^{his namesake} Talabani, who serves in the Democratic Party to which President Barzani belongs. The fact that he is a Kurd does not therefore mean that his joining the Government puts the ~~Kurdish~~ ^{Kurdish} Democratic Party in office, which is, as we have seen, still adopting an attitude of wait and see towards the Central Government.

All in all the reshuffle affects as many as nine ministers (see attached note) of which six are new appointments and three have ~~been~~ ^{been} moved to other posts. The new Cabinet states that it is to ~~proceed~~ ^{proceed} ahead with ~~the~~ ^{the} constitution of the National Assembly for which provision has already been made for 100

And the running



members nominated by the Revolutionary Council.

All this activity regarding internal policy goes on alongside the phase of activity in foreign policy, particularly inter-Arab pursued by Iraq at present.

*lancio
flung
thrust*
This new thrust in policy is clear ~~the Iraqi leap is obvious~~. It is based on a political factor of paramount importance ~~it~~ like the Agreement with the Soviet Union and an undisputable fact, the immense wealth of the country. So this should be added a special geographical position which is clearly reflected in Moscow's plans.

levitating
The combination of these factors has given Baghdad, and thereby its regime, a prestige without precedent in Iraq's recent history. It is, ~~however~~, incorrect to say that the phenomenon is ~~the~~ ^{making} ~~result~~ of a purely Iraqi ~~evolution~~. Soviet intervention has indeed been decisive not only through the conclusion of the Treaty but also in consequence of the enormous aid offered in the oil sector.

Now, if this ^{growth} ~~growth~~ in the importance of Iraq should take place for its own exclusive national purposes, we in the West and the Mediterranean, ^{who are} linked to these regions for so many reasons, should have nothing to take exception to.

The fact is, on the other ^{hand}, that Iraq already constitutes a very useful base for progressive Soviet expansionism in the peninsula, whether in the ~~at~~ direction of the Mediterranean or towards the South in the ~~Arab~~ ~~Persian~~ Persian Gulf and towards Saudi Arabia.

Since this involves an area which is vital for our freedom and our oil requirements, any apprehension and anxiety ~~can only~~ ^{cannot but} seem perfectly justified.

AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA

Indirizzato a:

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

316.01.00

R O M A

Baghdad 15 maggio 1972

Oggetto: Situazione politica interna

:

Dopo il Trattato con l'Unione Sovietica e le aperture di questo regime verso altri paesi arabi, l'impegno della leadership sembrà ora volgersi alla situazione politica interna.

Così, mentre l'azione politica esterna segue il suo nuovo corso sulla spinta degli eventi qui maturatisi in dipendenza del consolidamento della amicizia con Mosca, è parso necessario alla leadership di porre mano ad alcune iniziative tendenti a rinforzare la sua posizione di potere nel Paese.

In primo luogo si è provveduto ad una adeguata propaganda fra le "masse lavoratrici" in favore dell'Unione Sovietica e del Blocco dei paesi che ad essa fanno capo. Evidentemente questa è stata una misura concertata con Mosca e che si è articolata attraverso una intensa divulgazione di tesi anti-imperialiste, antisioniste ed anti americane.

./.

Tutte le sezioni organizzative del Baath, insieme con quelle del partito comunista e nazionalista già nasseriano, hanno risposto all'appello propagandistico che è stato esteso e ripetuto in tutto il Paese tranne, ovviamente, che nelle regioni curde.

Dopo questa preparazione di base il regime ha varato la milizia popolare che dovrebbe costituire la guardia armata della rivoluzione. L'iniziativa è stata sostenuta particolarmente dal Vice Presidente del Consiglio Rivoluzionario Saddam Hussein che quasi l'ha fatta propria.

Ufficiali dell'esercito, scelti fra i più giovani ed anche fra i più indottrinati al Baath, hanno avuto l'incarico d'inquadrare i volontari della difesa nazionale che si sono presentati al Paese nel corso di manifestazioni svoltesi nelle principali città.

A Bagdad hanno sfilato circa dieci mila miliziani, dotati di armi automatiche e persino di mezzi meccanici. Alla rivista, che sarebbe stata un trionfo personale di Saddam Hussein, è intervenuto però all'ultimo momento lo stesso Presidente della Repubblica il quale ha tenuto a pronunciare un discorso allusivo sulla necessità di unire gli sforzi costruttivi della Rivoluzione irachena evitando tutto quello che possa dividere il Paese.

E' sembrato a tutti che il Presidente al Bakr abbia voluto dare con le sue dichiarazioni una soddisfazione alle Forze Armate già scosse nel loro prestigio per tanti motivi ed ora scontente della creazione di queste nuove falangi popolari armate.

La leadership in tal modo ha coperto con una sua chiara volontà collegiale i sempre esistenti contrasti interni ed anche le eccessive velleità dello stesso Vice Presidente del Consiglio Rivoluzionario Saddam Hussein il quale, tuttavia, si è confermato su questa scena politica come l'uomo più valido al vertice del potere.

Dopo la costituzione della guardia armata della rivoluzione si è passati a riconsiderare il Fronte Nazionale la cui co-

stituzione rappresenta, com'è noto, un problema alquanto difficile. I curdi infatti continuano nel loro atteggiamento sospettoso e staccato nei confronti del Governo centrale. Essi assumono che una vera unità interna non può essere raggiunta se prima non verranno applicati praticamente tutti i punti del famoso Manifesto dell'11 marzo.

Quasiassi sforzo effettuato dalla leadership baatista per ammorbidire tale posizione è fallita, almeno fino a questo momento. Sono in corso, tuttavia, nei pressi di Suleimanih, vicino al confine con l'Iran, le massime assise del Partito democratico curdo che decideranno la linea che dovrà essere perseguita nella "lotta per sostenere i giusti diritti del popolo curdo".

Il regime in ogni caso insiste nella sua azione volta anche a cercare di convincere il leader Barazani che è ormai tempo di accedere ad una piena collaborazione col potere centrale. In ciò esso si avvale anche dell'appoggio sovietico e, pare, della mediazione offerta da questa Ambasciata dell'URSS che opera attivamente per il superamento delle difficoltà interne irachene.

Nell'attesa che eventi più favorevoli maturino circa l'eterna questione dei rapporti con i curdi, il Consiglio Rivoluzionario ha proceduto, come si è segnalato per telegramma, ad un importante rimpasto di questa compagine ministeriale.

Due comunisti e due nazionalisti nasseriani sono entrati a far parte del Governo il quale è stato sempre formato da elementi del Baath oltre a qualche tecnico di provata capacità. Il fatto è significativo perchè esso mostra la volontà del regime di allargare su altri partiti la sfera direzionale del Paese.

Ma il rimpasto non è soltanto importante per i suoi riflessi interni: esso è pure rilevante nei riguardi dell'Unione Sovietica e dell'Egitto, entrambi sostenitori da anni delle forze politiche irachene costituite dal partito comunista iracheno e dal partito nazionalista, fino a poco tempo fa noto come "nasseriano".

I Ministri comunisti sono: Mukarram al Talabani al quale viene affidato il portafoglio dell'Irrigazione, Dicastero tra i più importanti dell'Iraq, e Amer Abdullah Ministro di Stato.

Al Talabani, membro del Comitato Centrale del suo partito, è un curdo assai noto ma non è da identificarsi con un omonimo Talabani che milita nel partito Democratico di cui è Presidente Barazani. Il fatto che egli sia curdo non significa, quindi, che la sua entrata nel Governo investa il partito Democratico curdo tuttora, come si è visto, in posizione di attesa nei confronti del Governo Centrale.

Complessivamente il rimpasto riguarda ben nove Ministri (vedi nota allegata) dei quali sei di prima nomina e tre spostati ad altri incarichi. Il nuovo Gabinetto si dice che dovrebbe portare avanti i lavori per la costituzione dell'Assemblea Nazionale già prevista in 100 membri nominati dal Consiglio Rivoluzionario.

Tutta questa attività in materia di politica interna si affianca alla fase attiva di politica estera, soprattutto interaraba svolta dall'Iraq in questo momento.

Il lancio iracheno è evidente. Esso si basa su un elemento politico di primissimo ordine quale l'intesa con l'Unione Sovietica e su di un dato di fatto incontrovertibile: la immensa ricchezza del Paese. A ciò si aggiunga una particolare posizione geografica che si riflette vivamente sui piani di Mosca.

La combinazione di questi fattori ha dato a Bagdad e per esso al suo regime un prestigio che non ha precedenti nella recente storia dell'Iraq. Dire però che il fenomeno sia frutto di una levitazione puramente irachena è inesatto. L'intervento sovietico è stato infatti decisivo non solo attraverso la realizzazione del Trattato ma anche in conseguenza dell'enorme aiuto offerto nel settore petrolifero.

Ora, se questo crescere dell'importanza dell'Iraq avvenisse per suoi esclusivi fini nazionali noi occidentali e mediterranei, legati a queste regioni per tanti motivi, non avremmo nulla da eccepire.

Il fatto è, invece, che l'Iraq costituisce già una base assai utile per il progressivo espansionismo sovietico nella Penisola, sia in direzione mediterranea che verso il Sud nel Golfo Arabo-Persiano e verso l'Arabia Saudita.

Poichè si tratta di un'area vitale per le nostre libertà e per le nostre necessità petrolifere, ogni allarme ed ogni preoccupazione non possono che apparire perfettamente giustificati.

I R A Q

ALTE CARICHE DELLO STATO

(14 maggio 1972)

Presidente della Repubblica e del C.C.R. - Gen. Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr
Vice Presidente del C.C.R. - Saddam Hussein al Tikriti
Vice Presidente della Repubblica - VACANTE

MINISTRI

- Affari Esteri	- Murtadha Saeed Abdul Baqi
- Difesa	- Gen. Hamad Shehab
- Interni	- Gen. Saadun Gaidan
- Giustizia	- Hussain Mohammed Redha al-Safi
- Informazione	- Hamid al Jabouri
- Pubblica Istruzione	- Ahmed Abdul Sattar al-Jawari
- Istruzione Superiore	- Hisham Al-Shawi
- Gioventù	- Adnan Ayoub Sabri
- Finanze	- Amin Abdul Karim
- Petrolio e Risorse Minerarie	- Saadun Hamadi
- Industria	- Taha al-Jazrawi
- Agricoltura	- Mafidh Jalal
- Riforma Agraria	- Izzat Ibrahim al Doori
- Irrigazione	- Mukarram Al Talabani (1)
- Lavoro e Affari Sociali	- Anwar Abdul Kadir al-Hadithi
- Municipalità e Affari Rurali	- Ihsan Shirzad
- Lavori Pubblici e Alloggi	- Nuri Shawees
- Comunicazioni	- Rasheed Al Refaie
- Trasporti	- Khaled Makki al Hashemi
- Ricostruzione del Nord	- Mohammed Mahmoud Abdul Rahman
- Unità	- Abdullah al-Khaidar
- Sanità	- Izzat Mustafa
- Economia	- Hikmat al-Azzawi (2)
- Pianificazione	- Jewad Hashem
- Affari Curdi	- Saleh al-Yousif
- Ministro di Stato	- Nahzar al Tabaqchali (2)
- " "	- Amer Abdulla (1)

N.B. (1) comunista; (2) Nazionalista (Nasser.)

1. Mr Smith
2. Information and Research Dept

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
- 5 JUN 1972

NBR 1/2.

ITALIAN REPORTING ON THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

1. We spoke about the report from the Italian Ambassador in Baghdad ~~on~~ the recent Iraqi Ministerial changes. Mr Bonetti of the Italian Embassy had sent me this and Translation Section of Library and Records Department kindly provided the attached translation.

2. I have told Mr Bonetti that we should prefer to discuss Iraq with him next week rather than this in view of CENTO etc, but that we had been grateful for the report, the general assessment in which seemed very much in line with our own. We had not heard of the meeting of Kurdish leaders at Suleimaniah (page 3 of the report) and would be interested to know if he had any further information about this. As to the Ministerial reshuffle, it was clearly of some significance as an indicator of the new direction of Iraqi policy. We doubted, however, whether it was of itself as important a development as the Italian report suggested. The running of the country was still very much in the hands of the influential few and it was arguable that the changes were about the minimum the Iraqis could get away with without upsetting the Russians.

3. I think IRD should see these papers (and the letter from Mr Lewty at NBR 1/2 (2)). Will they be covering the subject of the Ministerial changes in their regular output? Perhaps we can have the papers back by early next week, ie before Bonetti calls.

Draw

D G Allen
MED

31 May 1972

*Thank you. IRD had already put out
background notes on Iraqi Communist
anticipation of government changes.*

*JS Hough
1/25
2/6*

ja

RESTRICTED

(5) 53

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 35
13 JUN 1972
NS21/2

Enter

Mr. Smith to see 2/19
13/2

14/6
14/6
6/2
to see

J Ashwood Esq
C R & E Department
D T I
1 Victoria Street
London S W 1

9 June 1972

14/6
to see
on 14/6

AUSTERITY PROGRAMME IN IRAQ

1. Please refer to my letters of 20, 25 and 27 May, 1972.
2. With the nationalisation of IPC on 1 June, 1972 the Austerity Programme is being taken more seriously here. Belt-tightening slogans are prominent in Baghdad. There is talk of a 20% cut in both government spending and imports. Foreign travel is now difficult for private citizens and is being restricted for officials. Imports of luxury items and other goods that can be made locally are to be restricted further; tenders for projects are still being issued, but contracts are not signed without a final approval from the Ministry of Planning; Letters of Credit are being delayed and given an extra scrutiny. It seems likely that some further restrictions may be necessary before very long.
3. As you will know, the sister companies of IPC, that is the Basra Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, were not nationalised. Basra in the south is able to operate independently of the Kirkuk and Mosul companies which are tied in to the Mediterranean pipeline. The loss of foreign exchange earnings expected from IPC will therefore not be complete, but it will be substantial, probably in round terms about £200m a year.
4. The Iraqis will endeavour to make this loss up with their own sales of oil for cash or in barter deals, or with foreign loans and credits. France and Italy have been the principal buyers of IPC oil in recent years. As you will know, CFP, the French partner in IPC, has been offered a special position by the Iraqis, and is considering its attitude. The Italian company ENI has, I understand, always been a maverick among Western oil companies, and already has a contract with the Iraqi National Oil Company for the supply of oil from the latter's wells in southern Iraq. It might make more sense for ENI to take oil from the northern fields. If INOC, which is also to market the northern Iraq oil for the Iraqi Oil Operations Company (the name given to the nationalised IPC), can retain the French and Italian companies as substantial customers then the Iraqis will be more than half way home in making up the loss of convertible currency revenue from IPC.

.../5.

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

5. Nevertheless, it seems likely to me that Iraq's convertible Foreign exchange earnings will be, in very round terms, £100m below previous expectations. This is likely to lead to a postponement of several important development projects and a slackening in the growth of the economy generally. This trend towards recession will be ameliorated by a good harvest this year, by such barter trading and foreign loans and credits as the Iraqi Government can arrange, and perhaps also by utilising Iraq's foreign exchange reserves of about £200m, which I understand have until now been largely immobilised as backing for the Dinar.

6. The net result for our trading prospects here seems likely to be unfavourable to a fairly considerable degree. Our consumer goods exports are vulnerable, but some may well continue as they are useful for revenue raising. It seems to me, however, that in the capital goods field we shall be more than somewhat at a disadvantage. The supply of machinery, equipment and services for development projects will increasingly be linked with barter trade, loans or credits. The French, described in the press here as "true friends of the Arab nation", had a large trade mission here last week, and some French bankers are still in Baghdad. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, with his oil and foreign exchange experts, is now visiting Moscow at the invitation of the Russians. While there he has signed another trade and economic cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. The East Europeans, accustomed as they are to barter deals, are also bound to show more interest in trading with Iraq.

7. I am sure that similar thoughts to those above will have occurred to you. Where does it leave us? Barter is seldom to our liking, and the Iraqis have little to offer other than oil. Credits will have to be considered very carefully, in the light of the nationalisation of IPC, but if we can be selective they should not be ruled out. These, and such quiet trade as our exporters can do for cash, seem to be our somewhat diminished trading prospects here until the IPC compensation issue is resolved.

8. I am copying this letter to Brian Smith of Middle East Department, FCO, and IC Scott in HCOB. Any further copying I leave to your discretion.

P Donovan

④

⑥

Credit and trade with France The documents exchanged between Iraq and France to increase credit facilities and trade between the two countries were signed at the Planning Ministry on 12th July by the Iraqi Planning Minister, Jawad Hashim, and the French Ambassador to Iraq. The documents are attached to the 1967 Iraqi-French trade agreement. They include French approval for an increase in credit facilities to Iraq from Fr. 225, 000, 000 to Fr. 635, 000, 000 and the granting to Iraq of other small and long-term credit facilities to purchase raw materials, consumer goods, light and heavy equipment and other industrial equipment. (Baghdad in Arabic 1500 gmt 12 July 72)

New post for Khalid Makki al-Hashimi Khalid Makki al-Hashimi has been relieved of his post as Transport Minister and appointed Ambassador at the Foreign Ministry. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 0936 gmt 12 July 72)

Algerian invitation to King Hasan II Sharif Bilqasim, the Algerian Minister of State, who has been on a mission to Morocco, confirmed before leaving Rabat for home that King Hasan II would pay an official visit to Algeria at the invitation of Bumadyan next autumn after Ramadan. The Minister said he had discussed questions concerning the region and bilateral relations with the King and Moroccan Government leaders. (Rabat in Arabic 2000 gmt 12 July 72)

Chinese-Moroccan sports co-operation The Moroccan Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, Sports and Youth, Arsalan aj-Jadidi, received on 12th July the Chinese charge d'affaires in Rabat and the Embassy's press and cultural attaches. The charge d'affaires handed the Minister a cine film of the Afro-Asian table tennis tournament which took place in Peking. On this occasion the minister and the charge d'affaires had talks which covered in particular questions of co-operation in the field of sport between Morocco and China. (Rabat in Arabic 1300 gmt 12 July 72)

63

Ente
WSB 1/2
1980/2

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD




UNCLASSIFIED
25/2

12 July 1972

E. K.

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O



Dear Graham

IRAQI MINISTERS

1. Two Ministers have recently lost their jobs. The Minister of Agriculture died as a result of injuries he sustained in a car crash while on his way to investigate the assassination of the Administrator of Sinjar (my letter 1/2 of 8 July, not to all). - NBR 1/4 (2)
2. The Minister of Transport was relieved of his post on 11 July, and appointed an Ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The last time this occurred (to Ammash and Sheikhly, then Vice President and Foreign Minister) they were shortly appointed to quite senior diplomatic posts abroad. At present as far as we know the Iraqi Embassies in Bulgaria and Egypt are still vacant.

*Yours ever
Ian*

*NBR 2/17
pa*

D I Lewty

c.c. Chanceries at:

BEIRUT
KUWAIT
TEHRAN

14 JUL 1972

cutting dated 19

Iraq Baathists firmly in control

From Paul Martin
Baghdad, July 13

Crudely drawn posters, depicting John Bull and Uncle Sam being unceremoniously booted out against a backdrop of oil derricks, adorn the walls of Baghdad.

Cloth placards, strung across streets and alleyways proclaim in forceful Arab rhetoric the event which amounts to an Iraqi Suez. Leading figures in the regime and ministers speak with confidence that the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company will be a complete success.

Already the government delegations and freelance oilmen have begun to arrive in Baghdad to discuss the possibility of buying Kirkuk crude oil. Commercial attachés from even the Western embassies and missions declare with satisfaction that the initiative of diplomacy has moved from politics to business.

The one thing that does seem certain is that the Baathist regime has gone into nationalization determined to fight to the bitter end. Surprisingly, there is little public euphoria. However, when the regime launches its celebrations this week to mark the ousting of the monarchy and its own rise to power four years ago it can claim to have fulfilled the ultimate nationalist slogan.

Despite the uncertainty of the future, the regime is firmly on its feet. The "endurance" euphemism for the austerity campaign it has launched to offset the loss in revenues from IPC—has yet to filter down to the average man.

Just how tough it will become depends on the success or failure to settle with IPC, or to dispose of more than 50 million tons a year from Kirkuk production.

But it would be wrong to suppose that the Baathists went head-

long into nationalization without first scientifically assessing the consequences. Dr Jawad Hashem, the Minister of Planning and the architect of the 1970-74 plan, claims that even the decision to cut this year's investment budget by half will cause no economic dislocation.

Since investment was raised to 242m Iraqi dinars (£200m) only after last year's record oil revenues from OPEC's price agreements with the companies, cutting it to 112m dinars will mean returning to the original plan. Hence, development can go ahead with the Government preserving its estimated 250m dinars in foreign exchange reserves.

"When we drew up the plan we did it taking into account three possibilities—the optimistic, the medium and the pessimistic", Dr Hashem told me. "Furthermore, we have set out to develop the economy away from its dependence on oil revenues. We have assessed it on the basis of being without any oil revenues at all."

The fact remains that the annual revenue from IPC of about £250m provided Iraq with 85 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings and paid for half of the budget. Now, apart from the continuing £134m from IPC's associate, the Basra Petroleum Company, in the southern fields, and the expected revenues from France, which is to buy oil from its un-nationalized 23.75 per cent share in IPC, Iraq will be deprived of this unless there is a settlement.

An encouraging thing, so far as the regime is concerned, is that it enters its fifth year of power with a degree of stability unknown before. The relentless and ruthless purges of a considerable opposition, have all but silenced the voice of dissent. Fear of the savage repression of the

past has transformed opposition into what one diplomat described as microscopic.

Furthermore, the regime's campaign to give itself the cosmetic effect of a national front has to a certain degree paid off. The present Cabinet, formed two months ago, includes Kurds, Communists, Nasserites and independents. However, since ministers are mere dispensers of the power generated by the 11-member ruling Revolutionary Command Council, this is but a delicacy.

So far as the past four years are concerned—perhaps the bloodiest in Iraq's modern political history—they have given the Baathist octopus a vice-like grip on the country.

The Army of 80,000 has been infiltrated by between 2,000 and 3,000 Baathist officers known as "the eyes of the Baath".

In addition, the National Command of the party has full control of the Army command and every security device has been employed to make the Army proof against coups.

One imponderable is the Kurdish question. Although the settlement with the Kurds has had two years to mature, the outbreak of violence two weeks ago shows how dangerous this could be for the regime. Emanating from clashes between the Army and Kurds around Kirkuk and in the western Kurdish town of Sinjar, it resulted in the Air Force bombing Kurdish villages.

It is fair to assume that the regime is sincere in its determination to stick to the settlement. The difficulties imposed by the present crisis over nationalization will reinforce this desire. In addition, the regime has at last got the Army in its barracks. The last thing it wants is to see it out again.

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Mr Burton

IRAQ: INTERNAL SITUATION

1. Mr Wright and I discussed this morning our arrangements for keeping abreast of current affairs in Iraq, given that we receive no political reporting as such from our Interests Section in Baghdad.
2. I mentioned that we make a practice of keeping on file any important Ministerial statements etc which come to our notice, eg through radio monitoring reports, the press and publications like the Middle East Economic Survey. It is true that a good deal of such material is of equal interest, given the current state of the IPC rangle, to Oil Department and some of it needs to be entered on other files. This does not however mean that we can ignore significant reports which also relate more particularly to the internal Iraqi scene.
3. Would you please have another look at the present arrangements and ensure that we are getting as full a picture as possible in present circumstances? In this connection, Mr Wright has asked whether the 1972 Annual Review will be for us, rather than Interests Section Baghdad, to prepare. Would you check on this too? If it is our responsibility, we shall need to make sure that we have a note of the key dates. Indeed, a running calendar ought already to have been maintained.
4. Perhaps we could discuss this when you have checked on the above points.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35

24 JUL 1972

NBR 1/2

D G Allen
MED

17 July 1972

M Allen *W. Wright*
Annual Review:

Reviews for Syria were, after the break in relations, compiled first by Research Dept and now by the Embassy in Beirut. 21 spoke to Mr Benneman, who was willing /8

undertake the first draft of the 1972
 Review for 1973. I said I thought
 we might reasonably ask our Interests
 Section in Baghdad to provide a calendar
 of events; if you agree, I will write
 to Mr Lewis accordingly.

WJH 17/7

I think the Calendar of Events is a
 fair task for Interests Section: if we write
 now, they will have plenty of time to
 spread the chore over the months between
 now & December 31. We might ask for the
 Calendar to reach us by, say, 15 Jan.
 1973.

2. If Oil Dept. is still in existence, much
 of the substance of the 1972 Review will of
 course be of interest to them but Research
 Dept. would of course consult the relevant
 papers in preparing their draft. If you
 agree, we might ask Mr. Bannerman if
 a cleared first draft could also be ready
 by 15 January next.

hall
 18.7.72

Mr Wright

Yes please.

1. Mr. Burton (for draft) 24/7
2. Mr. Bannerman 24/7
3. Mr. R. ... 24/7

WJH 31/7
 BU 30.11.72
 noted

NBR 1/2.

⑨A



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930 8440 ext 270

UNCLASSIFIED

D I Lewty Esq
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference MED

Date 24 July 1972

Dear Ian,

ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1972

1. We have been giving some thought recently to the preparation of this year's Annual Review for Iraq. In view of the restrictions imposed upon your section by the terms of the "break," the review must clearly be compiled outside Iraq. Research Department have kindly consented to undertake the task. However, they have suggested, and we agree, that the calendar of events should be prepared by you in Baghdad.

2. Unless you have any objection therefore, I should be grateful if you would arrange for the calendar to be drawn up and sent to us by 15 January next year.

Yours etc

Graham

G S Burton
Middle East Department

Mr. Burton
See Folio (9) of
NBR 1/2 (ATTACHED)
13/9
Then should be other
papers on this file including
a series of meeting between
Mr Allen & myself. Would you
be kind enough to have a look
for me?
18/8

13/9
26/7
BU 1
1 month
checked
BU further
man
18/12

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

10

01 BAGHDAD 210920Z AUG.

SECRET

DEDIP

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 382 OF 21 AUGUST, 1972.

INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT.

KUWAIT TEL NO 29 OF 21 AUGUST TO ME.

CASUAL COURIER.

WE SHALL CHANGE DATES AS SUGGESTED.

2.

THE ATMOSPHERE HERE SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS A POWER
STRUGGLE (IF THAT IS NOT TOO STRONG A WORD)
GOING ON IN IRAQ.

IF KUWAIT HAVE, OR COULD BE SENT, MATERIAL ON
E.G. THE REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ANY MENTION
OF SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, THE LATEST STATE
OF KURDISH / BAATH RELATIONS, THE RUMOURED APPOINTMENT
OF A KURDISH (FUAD AREF) AND ARAB VICE-PRESIDENTS,
I WOULD BE WILLING TO FLY TO KUWAIT MYSELF, IF YOU
THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE.

IF NOT, THEN CLARK WILL GO AS PLANNED.

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 21 AUG 1972 NBRI/2

*Reply sent
23/8
WJH pa*

LEWTY

FILES

MED

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COMMUNICATIONS D

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS.

SECRET

Reference

Restricted

M. D. G. Allen
M. E. D.

Mr. Smith
Mr. Barker


2/8/72

Mr. Barker may also like to see

I hear that Saad Habib, former
Director of Programmes on Cairo
T.V. has turned up in a
senior post on Baghdad T.V.

(2) Saad Habib was kicked
out by Sadat when he was
getting rid of fellow-travellers
at the time Ali Salbi was put
in prison.

(3) He is a top notch T.V. man.



R. L. BALFOUR

GIPD

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
22 AUG 1972

NBR. 1/2.

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PA

23/8

EN CLAIR

FM F.C.O. 231700Z

(NBR 1/2)

UNCLASSIFIED

1972

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO.253 OF 23 AUGUST/INFO KUWAIT.

YOUR TEL NO.382: CASUAL COURIER

1. THE MATERIAL DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO SUBJECTS
YOU LIST.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

MED

COMMUNICATIONS D

PUSD

28529/8
/m

August 30th, 1972

(REPUBLIC OF IRAQ)MARCH 11 AGREEMENT AT "CROSS-ROADS,"
BUT KURDS UNLIKELY TO RESUME FIGHTING

The Cairo newspaper AL GOMHOURIA recently published a report on relations between the Kurds in north Iraq and the Central Baghdad Government. The report, which was published on Aug. 17, quoted Habib Karim, Secretary-General of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), as saying that the truce agreement between the two sides, generally known as the March 11, 1970 Declaration, was in jeopardy, mainly due to the Government's Arabization policy in the north. In assessing the prospects of the situation, however, the newspaper said it was unlikely that the Kurds would resume the war against Baghdad.

Habib. The newspaper quoted the KDP's Secretary-General as saying the "March 11 Agreement was at the cross-roads, and that everything is threatened by failure." This, Habib said, is due to the Government's Arabization policy; an attack by unknown persons on the Mosul headquarters of the KDP; an attempt to kill Barzani's son; an attempt on the life of Barzani himself; the deportation of 40,000 Kurds to Iran under the pretext they were Iranians, and a plot to kill Barzani, in which one of his sons, called Ebeid, was allegedly involved.

Authority. Habib also complained that the Kurds were not represented on the Revolution Command Council (RCC), which wields the real authority in the country. The Kurds are represented only on the Cabinet, which has little power, he says. Moreover, the agreement to appoint a Kurdish Vice-President was never implemented. The newspaper said the KDP had nominated Habib to this post, but the nomination was rejected because his ancestry is Iranian. Habib said the Kurds were not consulted when the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed last April. The treaty, he said, backs the current regime at the expense of the other political parties and factions.

Positive Achievements. In spite of Habib's statements, the newspaper said, it seems that the greater part of the March 11 agreement has been implemented. Kurdish has been recognized as an official language, in addition to Arabic in the north; six Kurds were appointed as cabinet ministers; various Kurdish societies, schools and newspapers were established or reopened; an economic development plan for the north was drawn up; the agrarian reform law was implemented in Kurdish areas etc

Attitudes. The newspaper said there were three main attitudes in Iraq toward the Kurdish question. The first is the attitude of Arab rightists, who reject the Kurdish people's rights, particularly the right of self-determination. The second is the attitude of Kurdish rightists, who have an interest in the resumption of fighting, and who want to break away from Iraq, and establish a Kurdish state. The third is the attitude of Arab and Kurdish progressives alike, who recognize Kurdish nationalism and its right to autonomy within Iraq's framework, and who work for the full implementation of the March 11 agreement.

Fighting Unlikely. The newspaper said it was unlikely that the Kurds would resume their war against the Baghdad Government, for the following reasons: 1. it is not easy any more to convince the Kurdish people to carry arms again. 2. Kurdish forces have vacated important strategic positions, which are now occupied by Iraqi troops. 3. diminishing world, particularly Soviet, support for the Kurds, following the "progressive" moves taken by the Iraqi Government, and the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty. 4. popular support for the Government's decision to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which would expose the Kurds to the charge of collusion with world monopolies, if they resumed the fighting. 5. the withdrawal of the Communist Party's Ansar regiment, which used to fight on the Kurds' side. However, the success of all these factors in preventing the war is subject to "revolutionary alertness" and the growth of the democratic movement in the whole of Iraq, the newspaper said. A continuation of the peace would be a triumph not only to Kurdish nationalism, but to Arab nationalism as well, the newspaper added.

Resolutions of the International
Solidarity Conference with the
People of Iraq .



The International Conference for the Solidarity
with the People of Iraq in Oil Nationalization, which
convened in Baghdad from 17th to 18th August, 1972, stre-
ssed that the historic nationalization resolution of the
RCC in Iraq was a major contribution to the struggle against
imperialism and its monopolies and called for resisting all
pressures to impede Iraq from marketing its nationalized
oil. This was stated in the political declaration and the
resolution passed unanimously by the Conference in its
final session held at Al-Mustansiriyah University and
attended by delegates representing peace movements and
progressive parties and forces all over the world .

Following is the text of the political decla-
ration :

1. We, representatives of various political and
social organisations of different political and ideological
convictions, have gathered in Baghdad on 17th and 18th
August 1972 at the International Conference for Solidarity
with the People of Iraq in the Nationalization of Oil .

Cont'd....

We have come from 45 countries in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, representing 100 national and 12 international Organisations .

2. Oil is exceptionally important to Iraq; as it represents the main source of capital and energy ; and forms the basic raw material for chemical and petrochemical industries, which are vital for the country's industrial and agricultural development .

3. The Iraq petroleum Company, part of the international oil monopoly, had exploited Iraq's oil wealth since Iraq was under Ottoman and British occupation and domination. For many years . IPC manipulated the political situation in the country in order to maintain its exploitation. It used oil production levels and revenues as a means of exerting pressure on Iraq and obstructing the attainment of political independence .

4. Oil monopolies and imperialism have used all means of direct aggression as well as economic aggression and suppression against Arab liberation movement. The nationalization of IPC was the right answer to these aggressions, to the arbitrary and premeditated reduction in oil output and to the failure of the Company to admit Iraq's legitimate rights. Iraq, by nationalizing IPC , has exercised its right of sovereignty over its national resources, a right safeguarded by the United Nations .

Cont'd...

resolutions and by the International Court of Justice .

5. The Nationalization Act has opened up new prospects for the advancement of Iraq both economically and socially, and has consolidated Iraq's national independence. Thus oil wealth can better contribute to raising the living standards of the people of Iraq. Through nationalization Iraq has been given a real chance to eradicate poverty and disease and to provide a decent life to its working people. It has also provided an example for oil producing countries in the Middle East and the Third World to emancipate their national wealth from imperialist exploitation. The nationalization of IPC has created necessary conditions for new relations between oil producing and oil consuming countries on the basis of genuine mutual benefit. In addition, Iraq will be able to market oil for the benefit of its people and that of the peoples of Western Europe who need it , and not merely to boost up the profits amassed by the oil monopolies .

6. Imperialism, motivated by greed for greater profits and domination, is vigorously active in its attempts to prevent Iraq from marketing its nationalized oil. The imperialists are increasing their efforts and are using their reactionary allies in the Middle East against Iraq.

Cont'd.....

They attempt to bring about the failure of Iraq's Nationalization Act as a step towards pulling down the national authority in Iraq and as part of their plotting against the Arab liberation movement .

7. The Conference considers the nationalization of IPC as a major contribution to the struggle against imperialism and calls upon all forces of peace and progress to exert the utmost endeavour in making the historic nationalization resolution a success .

8. The Conference stresses the importance of the prerequisites for such a success, namely a militant unity among Arabs , Kurds, and other national minorities, and a massive mobilization of the Iraqi people's struggle to preserve their gains, which can only be served in the present circumstances by incessant efforts to establish a National United Front and its coalition government . The common struggle of the Arab peoples and their solidarity with Iraq are a major factor in foiling reactionary and imperialist schemings. Also, cooperation and coordination among Arab oil producing countries in resisting the pressures of oil monopolies will play a decisive role in the attainment of victory for the people of Iraq. The solidarity of oil producing and exporting countries through

Cont'd...

common efforts and plans can, as in the past , help in relieving IPC pressure upon Iraq .

The Conference , therefore, appeals to all people and governments of these countries to support Iraq against IPC manoeuvres and to bring nationalization to its victorious end .

9. The Conference considers that the forces of peace and progress, such as the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, the working class and democratic movements in the developing countries , and national liberation movements, have all material and political resources to provide all-round assistance to Iraq. They are capable of helping Iraq to maintain and increase oil production; to secure necessary markets for its oil, and to found and develop a highly-advanced oil industry. The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Iraq and the Soviet Union is a real and effective weapon against imperialist plots and machinations. With the assistance of the Soviet Union and Hungary, Iraq has succeeded in producing and exporting oil independently of IPC and its subsidiaries. The USSR all-round assistance and cooperation have contributed , and will continue to contribute , to the success of nationalization .

Cont'd....

Taking into consideration the attempts of oil monopolies to sabotage the nationalization of IPC, and the continuation of Israeli aggression, together with the intensification of imperialist intrigues against Iraq and the other Arab Countries, strengthening further Arab - Soviet friendship and cooperation has become an indispensable factor in subduing these attempts and achieving victory .

10. The Conference, whilst it greets the people and government of Iraq on their victory in nationalizing IPC , call upon all progressive forces and those who care for human dignity, prosperity and mutual cooperation among nations to fulfil the programme of action adopted by the Conference and give full support to the people of Iraq .


* * * * *

NOTE FOR FILE

COMPOSITION OF THE IRAQI RCC

1. It may be useful, now that we know that the RCC has been reduced by successive purges to a membership of 9 to set down exactly who they are:-

President Ahmed Hassan Al Baqr	Chairman
Sd Saddam Hussain Al Tikriti	Deputy Chairman
Sd Murtada Said Abdul Baqi Al Hadithi (Minister of Foreign Affairs)	Member
General Hammad Shihab Al Tikriti (Minister of Defence)	"
General Saadoun Ghaidan Al 'Ani (Minister of Interior)	"
Dr Izzat Mustafa (Minister of Health)	"
Sd Taha Al Jazrawi (Minister of Industry)	"
Sd Izzat Ibrahim Al Duxi (Minister of Agrarian Reform)	"
Sd Abdul Khaliq Al Samarra	"


G S Burton
Middle East Department

2 October 1972



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27 NOV 1972

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 450 OF 26 NOV 1972.
VISIT OF BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION.
PROMINENT NEWS TODAY IN BAGHDAD PAPERS IS THE
VISIT OF A BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION
CONSISTING OF ROBIN FILBER, ASST SECY-GEN SEMICOLON
JOHN PULMY, SEC FOREIGN RELATIONS BUREAU SEMICOLON
AND DREIS COX. THEY MET 25 NOVEMBER WITH ARAB BAATH
SOCIALIST PARTY (ABSP) DELEGATION LED BY SHIBLY
AL-AYSAMI ASST SECY GEN SEMICOLON HIKMAT AL AZZAWI
MINSTER OF ECONOMY, ALI GHANNAM, PROMINENT
MEMBER OF ABSP NATIONAL LEADERSHIP RECENTLY
RETURNED FROM MOSCOW, AND OTHERS.

2. BAGHDAD OBSERVER REPORTS THAT AT THE TALKS
MR FILBER REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNIST
PARTY AND ITS STRATEGY FOR BRINGING ABOUT STRUCTURAL
CHANGES IN BRITISH SOCIETY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE
POORER CLASSES.

3. COMRADE AYSAMI IN WELCOMING THE DELEGATION
EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN
LEFTIST FORCES AROUND THE WORLD AND INVITED THE
DELEGATION TO INFORM ITSELF OF THE VITAL PROJECTS
IN IRAQ.

4. COMRADE GHANNAM SPOKE OF THE ABSP HISTORY AND
STRESSED THAT THE PARTY HAS BYPASSED ALL OBSTACLES AND
CREATED A NEW ATMOSPHERE OF UNITY, SOLVED THE KURDISH
PROBLEM WITH A SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE (SIC) AND
ALLOWED A GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL FREEDOM TO
PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES. IRAQ IS VERY STRONG
ECONOMICALLY AND ABLE TO FACE THE OIL MONOPOLIES SINCE IT
TOOK THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS WHEN IT UNDERTOOK
NATIONALISATION.

5. THE BRITISH C P DELEGATION WILL MEET THE
KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE IRAQI COMMUNIST
PARTY WHILE THEY ARE HERE.

CUTTINGS TO FOLLOW.

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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests
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27 November 1972

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
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Dear Graham,

VISIT OF BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION

1. You will have seen my telegram no 450 of 26 November. I enclose cuttings from the Baghdad Observer about the visit.

(16)

2. Idris Cox, was here earlier in the month for the Oil Seminar, and may have arranged this visit then.

*Yours ever
Ian.*

I McCluney

[Signature]
11/12

ENCS

Representatives of ABSP, K.D.P. & I.C.P. welcome British C.P. delegation

A delegation of the British Communist Party, arrived in Baghdad Friday night for a one-week visit to Iraq, at the invitation of the National Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. The delegation, headed by Mr. Robin Filber, Assistant Secretary-General of the Party, comprises Mrs. Jean Bilkey member of the Party's Central Committee and Secretary of the Party's Foreign Relations Committee and Mr. Denis Cox member of the Party's World Marxist and Peace and Solidarity Bureau who represented the Party at the World Oil Seminar recently held in Baghdad.

Mr. Filber, speaking in an interview with INA on his ar-

ival, said: "We have come to Iraq imbued with great desire to acquaint ourselves with Iraq's political affairs. We are also most concerned in maintaining anti-imperialistic relations."

Mr. Filber valued the step taken by the revolutionary government in nationalising oil operations and said it was a very important one up the road of struggle against imperialism. He added: "We are here to step up cooperation and obtain first-hand information on developments in this country proceeding towards democracy and the creation of unionist establishments permitting the people of Iraq to practice democracy."

He went on to say that the British CP was interested in relationship between the three Parties as well as national affairs in Iraq.

Mr. Filber referred to the reports appearing in the capitalist press concerning the dialogue between the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party and said that we are confident that all problems put forward for discussion would be settled through positive debate.

The delegation was greeted at the airport by Dr. Zaid Haidar member of the National Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, Sd. Zuhair al-Kadari member of the Foreign Relations office of the National Leadership; Sd. Mohammed Mahmoud Abdul Rahman, Minister of Northern Affairs, a number of senior officials of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Sd. Karim Ahmad member of the Politburo of the Iraqi Communist Party, Sd. Amir Ahmadiah member of State and member of the Communist Party's Central Committee and Sd. Ara Khachader and Sd. Abdul Razak al-Safi both members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The British Communist Party delegation currently on a visit to Iraq yesterday morning went to see the Iraqi museum. The leader and members of the delegation expressed themselves impressed by Iraq's culture and civilisation over the ages.

BAGHDAD OBSERVER NOV 26, 1972

Aysami receives British Communist Party delegation

FIRST ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN ABSP NATIONAL LEADERSHIP & BRITISH CP

Comrade Shibly al-Aysami, Assistant Secretary General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party yesterday morning received the visiting delegation of the Communist Party of Britain.

In the course of the interview, Mr. Robin Filber, the British C.P.'s Assistant Secretary General and leader of the delegation, praised the progressive policy pursued by Iraq under the leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. He said that in his Party's view every blow dealt out to imperialism and its monopoly interests was an act of enhancing the struggle of progressive forces inside the imperialistic powers themselves.

Mr. Filber reviewed the history of the British Communist Party and said that presently the Party was pursuing a new strategy aiming for influencing the labour movement in Britain and taking political stands designed to bring about structural changes in the British society in the interest of the poor classes.

Comrade Aysami welcomed the delegation and emphasised the importance of direct contacts between progressive and leftist forces around the world

so as to serve joint interests in the struggle against imperialism and monopoly concerns as well as exchange experiences. Comrade Aysami said he hoped the delegation would inform itself of various vital projects in Iraq so as to form a true picture of the efforts made for building and progress.

Meanwhile, the Arab Baath Socialist Party delegation headed by comrade Ali Ghannam, member of the National Leadership, met with the British Communist Party delegation headed by comrade Filber.

The ABSP delegation attending the meeting which took place last night at the National Leadership building included comrades Hikmat al-Azzawi, member of the Baghdad Branch Leadership and Minister of Economy; Saad Qassem Hammouri, member of the National Information Bureau and Chairman of the Journalists Union, and Zuhair al-Qadiri, member of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the National Leadership.

The British Communist Party included comrade John Pulney, Secretary of the Foreign Relations Bureau and Comrade Dreis Cox, member of the International Marxism Bureau of Peace and Solidarity.

Comrade Ghannam reviewed, at the start of the meeting, the struggle history of the ABSP, on both the national and regional levels, and the achievements it accomplished for the Iraqi people after taking over the Governments following the July 17 revolution. He said that the Party in the course of its long struggle has been able to prove that Arab nationalism has human connotation and it does not persecute others because it has been subjected to persecution and to colonialism in its old and modern forms. Comrade Ghannam went on to add that the Arab unity, for the realisation of which the Party has been struggling, is an urgent revolutionary cause and it cannot be realized except by continuous national struggle against the forces opposing the interest of the Arab people.

After dealing with the achievements the Party has realized for the Iraqi people after the



Comrade Aysami receiving the British Communist Party delegation.



ABSP National Leadership and British Communist Party delegations open talks

July 17 revolution, the member of the National Leadership said that the revolution found itself face to face with a very heavy heritage represented by political, social and economic problems of which the country suffered a lot as a result of the false policies of formal regimes. He stressed that the Party has been able to by-pass all obstacles and to direct the process of creating a new atmosphere in which the unity of the country's national forces has been realized, that ABSP has solved the Kurdish problem with a spirit of struggle democratically and peacefully, granted a great deal of political liberties to the progressive political forces and allowed them to have newspapers and magazines as their organs.

Touching upon the economic, industrial and agricultural policy adopted by the Party, Comrade Ghannam said: "The revolution is paying the productive sectors the utmost of its interest with the object of building a progressive and independent Iraq able to face the schemes of imperialism. He emphasized that Iraq is at present economically very strong and is thereby able to face the oil monopolies especially that Iraq took the necessary measures needed for facing all probabilities when it undertook nationalisation."

Comrade Ghannam answered questions, addressed by the head and members of the British Communist Party delegation about various political, economic and social issues. The two delegations are due to meet on a later day to continue review and discussion of matters concerning the two parties and their relations. The British delegation will also hold a series of contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party in the course of the next two days.

The ABSP National Leadership gave last night a dinner party at Farouk Restaurant in honour of the British Communist Party delegation. The banquet was attended by members of the ABSP delegation and by representatives of the Parties and progressive forces in the country.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

I McCluney Esq
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

NBR 1/2

Date

7 December 1972

ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1972

1. On 24 July I wrote to Ian Lewty about the arrangements for this year's Annual Review for Iraq. — (9A)
2. There is just a possibility that you have not been shown my letter. I, therefore, gently draw to your attention the need for a calendar of events by 15 January.

G S Burton
Middle East Department

7/12
[Handwritten initials]

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BRITISH EMBASSY

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A D Harris Esq
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6 December 1972

Mr Bush 8/12
Mr Smith 2/12
Mr Hunt 8/12
Mr Wright 12/12

Copy to PUS 11/12
NBR 12/12
QBR 7/12

Dear Tony

IRAQI ASSASSINATION SQUADS

1. The press on 5 December published front page reports of an attempt on the evening of 3 December on the life of an Iraqi exile living in Kuwait, Ahmad Abdul Razzaq al Amer. Apparently the assailant approached al Amer just as he had got into his car to drive from his home to his office and fired a number of shots from a weapon variously described as a revolver or a machine gun. Al Amer was "seriously" wounded in the shoulder, and a "friend" in the car with him, Hassan 'Ubaid al Jaloub, was also hit, but it seems al Amer was still able to make an attempt to follow his assailant, who leaped into a small car and was driven off at high speed by an associate.

2. Al Amer, according to the press, was long an MP and was Vice-President of the Assembly in Iraq. He left after the July 1958 revolution and went to Jordan, where he eventually acquired a Jordanian passport. He came to Kuwait in 1960 and he has been practising law. He formed a group called "the Organisation of Iraqi Liberals", in opposition to the Qasim regime, but allegedly he gave up political activity in 1963 after Qasim's overthrow and has stuck to the law. Al Rai al Amm said his associates in the Organisation included Salih Saib al Samarra, a former Defence Minister under Nouri Said, assassinated in Beirut six years ago; Ismail Ghanim, a lawyer; the late Kadhim al Haidari (an old friend of mine who was the leading political radio commentator before 1958 and died several years ago of Parkinson's disease); and Colonel Salih Abdul Majid al Samarra, assassinated in Beirut last month. The Organisation was described as having worked to restore the monarchy to Iraq. The paper said that the assassins of Colonel Samarra might be behind the attempt but another possibility was personal enmity.

3. There can be no doubt that the Iraqi regime was behind this. We know al Amer was (and is) still politically active and he is obviously regarded as a nuisance best disposed of (pour encourager les autres). Though he is quite a different category from Hardan Tikriti (see our despatch 2/14 of 7 April 1971), the

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Kuwaitis cannot be at all happy that the Iraqis should once again have shown such a cynical determination to do their assassinating here and this must affect recent efforts to improve the substance of bilateral relations. We have not yet spoken to any MFA officials, and do not know if anything has been or is likely to be said to the Iraqis, even unofficially, but the Ambassador was interested to see Abdul Latif Thuwaini, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, emerging from the Foreign Minister's office when he took Lord Limerick to call on Shaikh Sabah yesterday morning. Lord Limerick's call was not a suitable occasion to raise the subject with the Minister, but we shall look for an opportunity to speak to officials about it.

Yours ever

Paddy

P G de Courcy-Ireland

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Political Situation In Iraq; List Of Iraqi Ministers. Political Situation In Iraq. 6 Dec. 1972. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/1897. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107471585/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=58f2036a&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.